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A CASE AGAINST TEMPORAL CRITICAL REALISM?
CONSEQUENCES OF QUANTUM COSMOLOGY FOR THEOLOGY
Willem B. Drees
1 Introduction
This paper intends to explore the consequences of contemporary
physical cosmology for theology. It will be argued that quantum cosmologies,
and the underlying ideas about quantum gravity, pose major challenges to our
understanding of time and knowledge. Though explorative in intent, the paper
is polemical in structure. The most widely held positions in contemporary
Anglo-Saxon discussion of science-and-religion combine a "critical realistic''
appreciation of science and religion with an evolutionary understanding of the
world and temporality as an essential element in our understanding of God.
This combined view I shall call temporal critical realism. The polemical thesis
is that these positions are unable to cope with quantum cosmologies, and hence
unable to fulfil their own promise of taking science seriously. They need to
change either their ontology or their epistemology.
Central to the epistemology of critical realism is the idea that science
aims at depicting the world. The approximations become omologically more
accurate as science develops better theories. The discussion will focus on
varieties of critical realism which assume that the most well-established theories
provide a view of the world which is reliable for metaphysical purposes, or
which combine emphasis on the unity of the sciences with a hierarchical
structuring of these sciences.' I will argue that such assumptions make it
1
 There are various versions of "critical realism." J. Leplin lists in the
"Introduction" to Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) ten
characteristic realist theses, about which actual realists happen to disagree. However,
"what realists do share in common are the convictions that scientific change is, on
balance, progressive and that science makes possible knowledge of the world beyond
its accessible, empirical manifestations,'1 2. Among ale defenders of critical realism in
the context of science-and-religion, mostly in combination with an emphasis on
temporality, are Harbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms; E. McMullin, "A Case for
Scientific Realism." in Scientific Realism, éd. J. Leplin (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984); A. R. Peacocke, emphasizing the hierarchical structuring,
especially Intimations of Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984);
T. Peters, "On Creating the Cosmos," in Physics; J. Polkinghorne, One World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); J. M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious
Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and various process theologians in the
Whiteheadian tradition. These authors may be taken to exemplify what has been
referred to as "temporal critical realism" in the present article.
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difficult to avoid the challenges from quantum gravity and quantum cosmology
(section 5).
Big Bang cosmology appears to be in line with temporal critical
realism: the expanding universe seems to line up well with evolutionary
worldviews developed in dialogue with biology. Various temporal critical
realists have pleaded caution with respect to the beginning, claiming at most
a form of consonance. However, they have often appealed to the Big Bang
theory as describing a dynamical universe. But analysis of the limitations of
the Big Bang theory shows that one should be equally cautious with statements
regarding the fundamental nature of time in Big Bang cosmology (section 2).
Quantum cosmology modifies the concept of time rather than extending time
beyond the initial singularity of the Big Bang theory. Quantum gravity and
quantum cosmology thus result in challenges for temporal critical realism
(section 3).
An alternative to temporal critical realism might be a more positive
appraisal of timelessness. This may give a platonistic flavor to the theological
schemes considered (section 4). If one is not prepared to grant timelessness
such a place, one might consider deviating from realism with respect to the
status of cosmology itself. However, if this is done in a rather ad hoc fashion,
the claim that critical realists take science seriously, even though not literally,
loses its force and thus its apologetic significance. Moreover, dismissing
cosmology brings in other questions regarding the status and the lity of the
sciences (section 5). Playing down cosmology might be acceptable if one were
to give up on the unity of the sciences, seeing them as different partial
constructs which need not fit into a neat whole. Such a theology would be less
inclined towards ontological statements, as is illustrated by Mary Hesse's work
(section 6).
One final introductory remark. Physicists, such as Isham, engaged in
quantum cosmology stress the tentative character of contemporary quantum
cosmology, noting that there are in fact no real theories here. I agree that that
is reason for caution, but I disagree when that is taken to free the philosopher
and the theologian from reflecting upon these theories. The arguments below
focus on general characteristics of quantum cosmology, rather than on specific
schemes. These developments affect our understanding of time, primarily in
a negative way, as research in quantum cosmology deviates for good reasons
from our previous ideas about time. Research in this area thus invites us to
rethink ideas based upon the concept of time as developed in relation to
experience at our own, classical level of reality.
2 Big Bang Cosmology and Theology
Some authors, such as the astronomers Roben Jastrow and Gerald
Schroeder, have claimed remarkable parallels between the creation narrative of
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Genesis and Big Bang cosmology.2 Other authors have taken the discoveries
to show the reality of a sudden beginning of the universe, which could serve
as a premise in a cosmological argument for the existence of God.3 Both
arguments are wanting as they pay insufficient care to the nature of the
.scientific and religious statements at hand.4 Temporal critical realists have
pleaded for caution with respect to such claims. A major argument for them
has been the possibility that "t=0" represents a kind of epistemological limit
rather than an absolute beginning. The harmony they envisage is not related
to "1=0," but rather to the basic role of time, i.e. the dynamic rather than static
nature of the universe (2.1). It will be argued that both the spacetime theory
underlying Big Bang models (2.2) and the limitations of such models (2.3)
make it possible to challenge not merely the absoluteness of the apparent
beginning, but the dynamic nature of the universe as well.
2.1 Critical Realists: Cautious Consonance, But Temporality
Temporal critical realists have not been lured into arguments based on
the initial singularity of the Big Bang theory. Even less have they been
templed by naive claims with respect to parallels between inflation—a brief
period of extremely rapid expansion of the early universe—and "the wind of
God moving over the waters'' of the second verse of Genesis.5 They are
generally open to the possibility that Big Bang theory might describe only a
cosmic epoch, perhaps in the context of an oscillating universe. Creatio ex
nihilo is taken as an on tological claim of dependence, rather than as a historical
claim about a beginning. For example, Ian Barbour writes:
The contingency of existence corresponds to the central religious
meaning of creation ex nihilo. On both sides the basic assertions
can be detached from the assumption of an absolute beginning. On
the scientific side, it now appears likely that the Big Bang was
indeed an absolute beginning, a singular event, but we cannot rule
out the possibility of a cyclic universe or infinite time. . . . With
respect to the central meaning of creation ex nihilo (though not with
respect to continuing creation) I agree with the neo-orthodox and
* R. Jastrow, God and the Astronomers (New York: Warner Books, 1980); G. L.
Schroeder, Genesis and the Big Bang: The Discovery of Harmony Between Modem
Science and the B Me (New York: Bantam, 1990).
' W. L. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London: MacmiUan. 1979).
4
 For more developed criticisms, see Drees, Beyond the Big Bang, especially ch.
1; and "Potential Tensions Between Cosmology and Theology" in Interpreting the
Universe as Creation, ed. V. BrOmmer (Kampen, NL: Kok Pharos, 1991), 71-75.
5
 Schroeder, Genesis and the Big Bang, 93f. Schroeder also correlates the
decoupling of matter and photons with God's injunction "Let there be tight," 88. The
six days of the biblical narrative and Big Bang theory deal with "identical realities . .
. described in vastly different terms," 26.
334 WILLEM B. DREES
existentialist authors who say that it is the sheer existence of the
universe that is the datum of theology and that the details of
scientific cosmology are irrelevant here.'
There is no support from cosmology for theology, or vice versa, though there
may be something less stringent, "consonance." These authors generally
consider as alternatives the Steady State Theory and an oscillating universe, as
well as the possibility of redefining time, with the effect that the singularity is
located in an infinitely distant past And if a theory of quantum gravity could
be found, "we would move the frontier of knowledge further back" (note the
temporality of this expression).7 The cautious attitude with respect to an
appeal to Big Bang theory has to do with the possibility that time might be
extended, rather than with the possibility that the concept of lime itself might
be of limited validity.
Whereas the apparent beginning of the universe is not taken as
important,1 authors such as Harbour, Peacocke and Peters have claimed that
Big Bang theory is significant in that it shows us the dynamical nature of the
universe, the essential role of time. As Harbour expresses it:
astrophysics adds its testimony to that of evolutionary biology and
other fields of science. Time is irreversible and genuine novelty
appears in cosmic history. It is a dynamic world with a long story
of change and development On the theological side, continuing
creation expresses the theme of God's immanence and participation
in the ongoing world.'
These authors all avoid simplistic identification of the initial singularity with
the theological concept of creation, although they feel at home with, consonant
' Harbour, "Creation and Cosmology," in Cosmos as Creation, 141 f. Similarly
Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, 79; and "Theology and Science
Today," in Cosmos as Creation, 33f; and McMullin, "How Should Cosmology Relate
to Theology?" in The Sciences and Theology, 38.
1
 Peters, "Cosmos as Creadon," in Cosmos as Creation, 107.
1
 Except, to some extent, by Peters, who believes that there is "surprising and
salutary consonance" between the theological idea of creatio ex nihilo "formulated in
terms of an original beginning of time and space" and contemporary astrophysics (T.
Peters, "On Creating the Cosmos," 276). However, he makes a distinction between the
abstract creatio ex nihilo as ontological dependence and the assertion that there was a
beginning as a concrete form of explicating creatio ex nihilo. "It is, of course, possible
for a theologian to speak metaphysically about the utter dependence of the Creadon on
its creator without reference to a temporal beginning" (ibid., 274). He acknowledges
that "oscillatkmism" is still an alternative type of theory and that the Big Bang (i.e. the
Planck Time) is "a methodological frontier and not the full ontological affirmation made
by Christian theology" (T. Peters, "Cosmos as Creation," 107).
' Barbour, "Creation and Cosmology," 143.
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with, the Big Bang cosmology. They intend to restrict themselves to the more
general, apparently more safe, features of the model. The alternatives that are
considered are, basically, alternatives with an infinite past—a longer extension
of the dimension time. This would nol affect the claim that we live in a
dynamic world.
There is no doubt that we have indeed come to realize that darkness
at night implies that we are not living in a static universe (Olbcrs' paradox).
Stars age. The average dislances in the universe are increasing; we live in an
"expanding universe." The abundances of chemical elements have been traced
back to nuclear processes in stars or to processes during "the first three
minutes." We do live in a dynamic universe, as seen from the inside.
But is this the most fundamental view of reality? Is it a fair
"approximation'' to "the way it really is," to use a critical realistic phrase? It
is essential to be aware that this is a view "from inside." What is the
significance of this perspective? It may not be the final perspective, "the view
from nowhere," as Thomas Nagel puts it10 It is rather a view from "now-
here." Are there any reasons to believe that a wider, more fundamental,
perspective will seriously affect our understanding of the dynamical nature of
the universe? First, we will consider the spacetime view of relativity theory
and its implications for the emphasis on time (2.2). Second, we will consider
some limits of the Big Bang theory and options for future theories (2.3).
2.2 The Challenge of "Spacetime"
One way to challenge the emphasis on time would be to invoke the
special and general theories of relativity. In the special theory of relativity the
notion of simultaneity as having a universal meaning with respect to a "now"
is lost This in turn raises serious issues for statements about God having time,
being related in a special way to "the past" or acting as to influence "the
future." "Past" and "future" can be used as concepts relative to a observer
located at some position on a specific worldline in spacetime. The problem
arises when a definite article is used, speaking about "the past" and "the
future," as if these are global concepts. Thus, problems arise in theologies
which insist that "God's future" is open, or make other claims which assume
the existence of a universal notion of time.11 As long as God lacks a specific
location and stale of motion, it is difficult to understand the meaning of God
knowing "the past" or influencing "the future." At least three ways to get
around the theological consequences of this loss of a single universal time have
been proposed. One is to allow for the co-existence of more than one time in
God. Another, defended by Polkinghorne, is to invoke God's omnipresence.
10
 T. Nagel, Tke View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press. 1986).
" The description of the problem as one with the definite article has been taken
from an unpublished note from C. J. Isham; see also the article by Isham and
Polkinghome in this volume. The problem is discussed theologically, but not solved,
in C. Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for our Time (La Salle: Open Court, 1967), 93f.
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A third option is to argue that there is a physical basis for a universal time by
taking into account the cosmological background radiation. We will consider
these options in turn:
(1) Some have argued that one might consider the co-existence of our
time with other time series. However, if they are taken to be unrelated except
for their co-existence in God,12 "multiple time sequences" are of no help with
the relativity problem. They refer to different spacetimcs and therefore they
don't solve the real problem of coordinating multiple observers existing in one
spacetime. If one were to apply the idea of "multiple times" to the various
times arising for different observers in one spacetime, these time sequences are
strongly correlated. One might say that God is related to all those times.
However, that would not introduce a universal notion of simultaneity which
would allow for statements about God's relation to "the future" or "the
present." To say that God is related to a multitude of times which are
correlated as the various times of a single spacetime are, is equivalent to saying
thai God is related—in some non-temporal way—to the whole of spacetime.
(2) Polkinghorne suggests that omnipresence provides a way out He
argues that an omnipresent God is spatially coincident with every spacetime
point, and thus has no need to use signalling to tell him what is happening and
so he has instant access to every event as and when it occurs. That totality of
experience is presumably the most important thing to be able to say about
God's relation to world history."
But Polkinghome's description is ambivalent "When it occurs" may
be read as a reference to a hidden background of universal time, making
possible a reading of "the totality of experience" as a three dimensional present.
This seems to be Peacocke's reading when he stales that "the future does not
yet exist in any sense, not even for God," where "God is conceived as holding
in being in physical time all-that-is at each instant and relating his own
succession of divine slates (the divine "temporality") to the succession of
created instants."14 Such a reading of Polkinghome's solution is not in line
with relativity theory, as it introduces a universal sense of now, correlated with
that three-dimensional "totality of experience."
Another, perhaps better, reading of Polkinghome's proposal takes it
thai "when it occurs" means that God has equal access to events at all
spacetime points—whether deemed future, past or present from any spacetime
point. But then God's temporality is lost; the "totality of experience" covers
four-dimensional spacetime as a whole.
12
 Suggested by K. Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1982), 166; discussed by B. Leftow, Time and Eternity (lihaca
Cornell University Press, 1991), 29.
11
 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 82; see also the opponent of the block
universe in the article by Isham and Polkinghorne in this volume, especially his point
(8).
14
 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 131.
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(3) One might suggest that classical Big Bang cosmology solves some
problems with respect to God's time, as there might well be a way to define
a global time in an expanding universe. For example, one might use as the
frame of reference that frame in which the background radiation is
homogeneous. However, it is not clear that there is such a universal time
outside the simplified homogeneity and isotropy of the Fnedman-Robeitson-
Walker models. Besides, general relativity, on which the Big Bang theory is
based, seems to make problems worse. Time may be a locally applicable
concept, but still there may be no definition of time that covers the whole
spacetime manifold.
Similar "block" views of time arise in other physical theories which
deal with whole possible histories at once as trajectories in phase space.
Temporal critical realists have not dealt satisfactorily with such "block" views.
However, the following will not develop the consequences of classical
spacetime views; rather we will ask whether the problem changes once we turn
towards quantum cosmology. It might be the case that a notion of a single,
flowing, universal time is possible, once general relativity as the framework for
cosmology is succeeded by a quantum theory which integrates space and time
as well as matter. Running ahead of the argument, the conclusion of the
reflections on quantum cosmology will be that such a hope for a recovery of
time will not be fulfilled. Rather, things will become worse. Before turning
to quantum cosmology, however, it is important to see why such a further
scientific development beyond the Big Bang theory is needed.
2.3 Limits of the Big Bang Theory
The Big Bang theory is the accepted theory about the evolution of the
universe over billions of years. It relies upon two types of theories: general
relativity describing spacetime and quantum theories describing matter. Both
theories have their limitations; furthermore, they are hard to combine.
From our perspective, the theories of matter are the first to present
problems near to 1=0. Current theories about matter are valid only up to a
finite température, and hence only valid after the first fraction of a second
following the Singularity at t=(), the initial moment entailed by general
relativity. This implies an cpistcmological boundary to the domain where the
Big Bang theory can be trusted. Further speculations have to deal with
circumstances (temperatures and densities) for which the relevant particle
physics is not yet well established.
Closer to toe Singularity comes a moment, presumably the "Planck
Time" (a number constructed from fundamental constants of quantum theory
and gravity, about 10"" seconds after the initial Singularity), where general
relativity must be replaced by a quantum theory of gravity. Such theories do
not exist yet, but some current ideas will be discussed below (section 3). The
meaningfulness of "time" will turn out to be uncertain. This is a troublesome
conclusion; once "time" is no longer unambiguous, it becomes unclear what can
be meant by "before" or by "the Planck Time."
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If ant were to continue backwards in time, the initial Singularity itself
would be a third limit, where the theory of general relativity, the theory about
spacetime, breaks down. However, as this limit lies beyond the Planck Time,
and thus in a realm where general relativity has to be abandoned anyhow, it is
not clear in what sense this limit might be relevant. This cannot be decided a
priori, without considering the actual theories of quantum gravity that have
been proposed. Whereas the first and second limits are limits to our present
knowledge, the third seems to be an edge, an oncological discontinuity—but it
is hidden behind the other two.
Temporal critical realists seem to hold thai the major uncertainty
regards the third limit Has there really been an absolute beginning, or is there
continuity—for example in an oscillating universe, extending our "past time"
indefinitely or even infinitely. That was also the issue between the Big Bang
and Steady State theories. If the alternative is seen this way, we might well
trust the Big Bang theory in its proper domain, and leave the speculations of
quantum cosmologisi aside as not relevant to our understanding of the
dynamical nature of our cosmic epoch. For instance, Peacocke discusses the
Hartle-Hawking concept of imaginary time, but dismisses it as irrelevant, since
"by the point at which biological organisms appeared on the Earth, the
postulated imaginary component in Hartle and Hawking's physical time would
have diminished to insignificance in their theory. So, with this cosmology, we
are still free to employ the concept of the personal to interpret God's relation
to the universe which goes on being created by God."15
If the problem is formulated as a problem about the absoluteness of
the initial singularity, there is an implicit assumption of a fixed background
time which could be extended beyond "1=0." The problems with such an
approach are the problems facing creation in spacetime, as discussed by Isham
in this volume and previously.
An alternative possibility, however, is that it is the conceptual ity which
is at stake, as a consequence of the breakdown of general relativity, and hence
of its notions of time and space. In that case, we are not merely stumbling
upon a possible ontological discontinuity, but rather the ontology—the basic
conceptuality in terms of which we think of our world—has to change
radically. As the successor to classical cosmology, quantum cosmology would
imply a reinterpretation of the meaning of the Big Bang theory as well. Rather
than considering creation in spacetime, this is the approach that considers
creation of spacetime.
Changes in conceptuality have been typical of fundamental transitions
in physics, such as those from classical physics to quantum physics and from
Newtonian conceptions of space and time to those of the special and general
theories of relativity. Knowledge was not merely extended to the very small
or the very fast, but rather restructured. These from a realist perspective, new
theories led to a reinterpretation of the world. In an instrumentalistic vein,
" Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 133f.
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focusing on predictive power the old theory is a continuous limit of the new
one; but conceptually or ontologically it is radically different. Although toe
empirical or observational consequences of previous theories, as far as
corroborated by experiments, are reproduced by the new theory, even if the
new theory is cast in radically différent conceptions. Such a transition is at
stake with respect to quantum cosmology as well: it leads to a retnterpretation
of our concepts regarding the world—especially the concept of "time." And
that change is not restricted to cosmology, as die theory at stake is quantum
gravity, intended to be a universal replacement of Newtonian and Einsteinian
views of space and time. If such a radical change in our ontological
conceptualily is possible, due to the second limit of the Big Bang theory, the
fundamental dynamical nature of the universe is open for reinterpretation, and
not merely the absoluteness of the apparent beginning.
3 Consequences of Quantum Cosmology and Quantum Gravity
Time in the context of rclaüvistic spacetime theories is a
phenomenological, "internal" construct. One might well see this as a modem
day equivalent of Augustine's view of creatio cum tempore, time being pan of
the created order. The discovery of "internal" time, as characteristic of the
theory of general relativity, has paved the way for a second discovery, the
discovery of the limited applicability of the concept of time, as is typified in
of quantum cosmologies and quantum gravity. We will consider these two
developments in turn.
3.1 External and Internal Time
Isham, in his contribution for this volume, explains why origination of
the material universe in a fixed background spacetime is problematic. One of
the major problems is the problem of choice: "within an infinite, pré-existent,
and homogeneous timeline, there is simply no way whereby the mathematics
can select one particular time at which creation occurs."16 Quantum theories
which work with probabilities (e.g., instances per unit time) tend to introduce
a plurality of origination points. This would lead to interacting "universes,"
contrary to the available empirical evidence.
Hence, physicists have turned to the development of theories which
describe creation <?ƒ time rather than creation in time. General relativity theory
offers a fundamental hint in that direction. Whereas in a fixed background,
time may be seen as external with respect to the system, the situation in general
relativity is different Here time is understood as an "internal" variable. For
" This objection to creation in time is not a new insight; for example, it was
considered by Augustine (Confessiones 11, XII. 14) and, centuries earlier, by an
epicurean, as [old by Cicero in his De natura devront 1.9,21.
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example, one might attempt to define time in relation to the average distance
between "test-particles" such as galaxies, or one might use the température of
the background radiation or features of other material phenomena. The
evolution of properties of the universe in time is thus transferred to statements
about the correlation between, for example, the temperature and other properties
of the universe.
In traditional quantum theory, the fundamental equations (like the
Schrodinger equation) describe the evolution of the wave function (or state
vector) in time. This means that the properties of the system are given by a
time dependent entity. "Thus 'time' is arguably pan of the classical
background which plays such a crucial role in the "Copenhagen' interpretation
of the theory."17 In some approaches to quantum gravity there might be a
background structure which is sufficiently rich as to include some concept
similar to classical time. However, those approaches have the same problem
as described above for creation in a fixed background spacetime.
Quantum gravity and quantum cosmology have really taken a different
approach.1' The background structure is not a four-dimensional spacetime,
but rather a three-dimensional space. On this three-dimensional a wave
function is defined which spécifies curvature and matter. The "notion of time
(and therefore spacetime) has to be extracted in some way from these
variables."19 Thus, the dynamical evolution might be recovered by defining a
time variable on the basis of a suitable variable constructed either out of the
curvature or out of the matter fields (hence either like average distance, or
volume, or like background temperature). Though the external time has
disappeared, the quantum scenario could be seen as open to two equivalent
representations: an evolutionary one and a frozen one. However, the
evolutionary representation is slightly odd, compared with evolutionary
equations which arise in conventional quantum theory. This deviation is an
advantage in the context of the program of quantum cosmology, the attempt to
construct a genuine theory of origination of die universe. It leads us to the idea
of "imaginary time."
' C. I. Mum, "Conceptual and Geometrical Problems in Quantum Gravity.
Lectures presented at the Schladming Winter School," (Preprint Imperial/TP/90-91/14),
74.
" Beginning at least with B. S. DeWitt, "Quantum Theoiy of Gravity: I, u,"
Physical Review 160(1967), 1113-1148, 162 (1967X 1195-1239.
* C. J. Isham, "Conceptual and Geometrical Problems in Quantum Gravity," 75.
In his contribution to mis volume, Isham discusses the problem of selecting a unique
wave function for the universe. A genuine "creation" theory would have to predict all
features of the universe, but assumptions are always fed into such theories. For
instance, in the scheme he discusses here, pan of the (contingent) background is the
assumption of a three dimensional manifold of fixed topology. Issues of uniqueness and
background might be very relevant entrances to philosophical and theological reflection,
closely related to questions of contingency and necessity. However, these issues are
beyond the scope of the present article, which focuses on time.
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3.2 The Limited Applicability of Time
Superspace is the collection of all possible configurations of curvature
and matter on a given three-dimensional manifold. As Isham explains, a series
of such possible configurations—a possible history of a universe—corresponds
to a path in that superspace. However, quantum theory is such that it does not
result in a single history, as if there were only a single path in superspace with
non-zero probability. Just as in conventional quantum theory, each classical
history will be slightly fuzzy, as slightly deviating histories have lower, but still
non-zero, probability amplitudes. Besides, the wave function turns out to have
a number of paths around which it is peaked, and thus to describe a whole set
of (approximately) classical histories. The spaceumc picture would not be
unique, even if the wave function were unique.
Isham distinguishes two regions in superspace. In one region the
spacetime picture corresponding to a path is fairly well in accord with the
general relativistic view (and thus, aside of the spacetime problem discussed in
2.2, with our common sense understanding of time). But other regions of
superspace do not lend themselves to such an interpretation. These regions are
part of the theoretical structure and cannot be omitted, unless in an
unsatisfactory ad hoc fashion. For trajectories in this realm of superspace,
space and time do not correspond to the relativistic case (recognizable by the
Lorcnt/ distance formula x2 + y2 + z* - c¥). For trajectories from this realm,
time and space variables appear in the equivalent formula completely on a par,
as there appears a plus sign rather than a minus sign in all four terms of the
distance formula. It is in relation to this realm that some have spoken of
"imaginary time." Taking time to be imaginary, one might retain the minus
sign in the formula. However, it seems as accurate to say that another formula
is applicable. The corresponding four-dimensional space is highly quantum
mechanical. It is far more fuzzy than the spacetimes corresponding to paths in
the other region of superspace, as the solutions peak less around certain paths
in superspace in this second region. Isham calls this quantum mechanical four-
dimensional realm "imaginary spacetime." Whether one wants to say that the
concept of time has become meaningless or that time has become imaginary
may be a matter of taste. However, it certainly is not the kind of time which
allows for clear successions of events.
By way of summary, two features of the canonical approach to
quantum gravity may be emphasized. First, the fundamental ontology
(background structure) assumes a three-dimensional manifold, rather than a
four-dimensional spacetime. The ontology contains as well a whole collection
of possible configurations of geometrical and material configurations on this
manifold: superspace. "Time" is a derivative notion, well defined only for
certain subsets of, or certain paths in, this superspace.
Second, wave functions arising in this theory may be interpreted as
describing a realm where the concept of time is meaningless and a realm where
a relativistic concept of spacetime is meaningful. Even this more classical
reality is, however, fuzzy for two reasons. A wavefunction corresponds to a
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plurality of paths describing pure classical space times, and each path has the
fuzziness which is typical of conventional quantum theories.
It is important to note that the relevance of these ideas cannot be
restricted to considerations regarding the quantum theory of the origination of
the universe. Rather, it purports to be the quantum view of the universe or,
even more significantly, the quantum theory of lime (and space, but less so as
some features of space are still assumed as pan of the background structure).
As the quantum theory of matter or radiation is different from classical theories
of matter or radiation, so is the quantum theory of space and time different
from classical theories of space and time.
3.3 Challenges for Temporal Critical Realism
"Temporal critical realism" was taken to combine an epistemological
and an omological position: science has to be taken seriously, but not literally,
and reality is best described in dynamical terms, including its relation to God.
Quantum cosmology and quantum gravity seem to challenge these positions.
Let me begin with a remark about the epistemological issue.
Critical realists tend to see science as a more or less continuous series
of successive approximations of increasing accuracy in depicting reality.
However, the concept of approximation ties in with instrumental istic approaches
to the mathematics, whereas quantum cosmologists tend to be more platonistic,
for example, with respect to the reality of mathematics. If mathematics is seen
as a tool, it may be more or less adequate in describing properties of entities.
For example, in stating that an object has a mass of 4.3 kilograms, one means
that it has that mass with the required precision, say, give or take at most 50
grams. Physical reality is modelled mathematically, but the model is
considered to be an approximation. If, on the other hand, reality itself is
assumed to be mathematical, one does not deal with approximations. For
example, it is not clear in what sense the fundamental symmetry group
underlying the particle world could be approximately group X—it is group X
or it is not. This may need some qualifications in relation to spontaneous
broken symmetries. However, it remains the case that the alternatives seem to
be much more discrete than in an instrumentalistic approach to the
mathematics. "One of the most fascinating features of mathematical structures
as models of the world is their apparent ability to justify themselves. These
structures are so strictly connected with each other thai they seem to be
necessary and to be in no way open to arbitrary, speculative alterations."20
In addition, the theories developed successively in cosmology, from
Newton through Einstein to quantum cosmology, tend to be continuous with
respect to the numerical outcome of certain calculations, but to differ radically
10
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in their fundamental conceptualities. Hence, it is hard to make clear in what
sense these models depict reality approximately, and thus how they refer.
Dismissing quantum cosmology for this reason as too speculative seems an
unfair, ad hoc, move, which would be a betrayal of the intent to take science
seriously.
The epistcmological consequences from cosmology, as well as from
other significant discontinuities in fundamental physics, may be at odds with
"critical realism." However, the main targets of the defenders of "critical
realism" seem to be sociological, psychological and idealistic reductions of
physical and religious reality to ideas produced by humans. The plalonic
realism under consideration here does not suffer from such a reductionism. It
might therefore be possible for critical realists to change their epistcmological
position by accepting a kind of plalonic realism (as quite a number of
mathematicians lend to do). We will return to epistcmological issues below
(section 5).
The temporal critical realists lake time to be fundamental; reality is
dynamic. This position has been developed for a variety of reasons; prominent
among them is the desire to accommodate insights from the evolutionary
sciences. Reality is, of course, dynamic and evolving, if considered on an
intermediate scale from a point of view within an almost Newtonian epoch.
However, questions arise already when one considers larger scales and has to
take account of the conceptuality of general relativity. The dynamic picture
may be extendable to the quantum level, the finer detail of photons and
electrons. However, further down in scale, to the quantum gravity level, the
conceptuality of dynamism breaks down. "Deep down" the ontology is
different. It is not limited to quantum cosmology, as it has to do with quantum
gravity a theory with universal applicability. And it is not just a detail at some
irrelevant scale, because it affects, or should affect, the concepts of space and
time as they are used at all levels. At the Newtonian level of description,
space and time are taken to be universal, infinitely extendable continua. The
special theory of relativity has raised problems with the universal simultaneity
of time. General relativity calls into question the extendability of time, as
singularities arise. And quantum gravity takes away the fundamental stales of
time. The still speculative ideas at the frontier of cosmological research, and
even the standard theory of spaccume (General Relativity), thus suggest that the
evolutionary presentation is one of limited validity, and not the most
fundamental one. Hence, theological insights developed in the dialogue with
the evolutionary understanding of the natural world are not directly extendable
to the dialogue with cosmology.
It seems as if the temporal critical realists have not been considering
such a shift in conceptuality as a reason for caution. They pleaded caution
with respect to the t=0 in Big Bang theory, because of the possibility of an
extension of past time. However, as Isham makes clear in his contribution, a
cyclic view seems incompatible with the spacetime picture in contemporary
theories of quantum cosmology and quantum gravity. The alternative is not an
extension to earlier times, but a reuiterpretation of time, and hence a
reinterprelation of the meaning of the Big Bang model itself.
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If the temporal perspective is considered to be essential to Christianity,
there is a conflict with cosmology. However, it might be that it is possible to
accept the cosmological view of time, embedding the common sense temporal
view in a wider timeless view sub specie aeternitatis, provided a meaningful
formulation for human responsibility in relation to human actions (within the
spacctime framework) could be found. We thus will turn from theologies
which emphasize temporality to theologies which grant timelessness a more
prominent place.
4 Platonizing Theology
A metaphysical view of reality as timeless and as of a self-justifying
mathematical nature seems at odds with the emphasis which many theologians
place on contingency and time as major aspects of the Christian doctrine of
creation.21 A defensive approach would thus be to emphasize all the
contingency that is left. However, might it not be that the contingency and
temporality under consideration are not necessary to a proper view of God?
One may be able to defend such a claim if one does not presuppose a
voluntarisiic understanding of God as creator, but rather supposes that God
creates according to certain "internal necessities." For instance, God might not
have been able to create something logically contradictory; the fundamental
rules of logic would reflect God's rationality. Similarly, perhaps God could not
have created something wicked or ugly, as goodness as well as aesthetic
elements are intrinsic to the divine.21 Michael Heller proposes to interpret the
rationality displayed by the universe as an ultimate rationality, which is God's.
Platonic and neoplatonic philosophies, and theologies inspired by them, have
always been inclined to regard the world as a reflection of "eternal objects" (for
which one may read "mathematical objects") that dwell in God's mind. Thus,
he points out that the metaphor of "God thinking the Universe" is well rooted
in the history of theology.23 Platonistic tendencies in cosmology may well be
developed into a philosophy which extends the issues from mathematical
intelligibility to wider concepts of rationality, and from there into values.
Another further development of such a platonistic philosophy might extend the
discussion on mathematical intelligibility so as to introduce the notion of spirit
11
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or mind. "From the theological perspective, there is an intimate relationship
between the spirit of rationality and the Christian idea of the Logos."2*
In suggesting that quantum gravity might correlate well with a
platonizing theology, I do not intend to make a historical claim. The concept
of "platonism" certainly needs to be defined with greater precision. For the
moment I intend only to draw attention to a number of different features which
seem to apply to almost all fundamental scientific cosmologies, and which may
transfer to the way ideas about God are formulated.
The following sections will give a limited survey of discussions
regarding elements of such an understanding of God, considering divine
eternity, divine action, and the way in which God may be conceived of as
explanation of the universe. It is not an exhaustive presentation of such
theologies, but an initial exploration of contemporary discussions. Is it possible
to think theologically along such lines? Some hesitations will be expressed
(4.4). Whereas this section explores the possibility of changing the omological
assumption underlying temporal critical realism, further sections will explore
possible changes in epistemology.
4.1 Divine Eternity
Recent philosophers and theologians tend to think that anything that
could count as God—as the living, loving person whom the Old and
New Testaments depict as in dialogue with the creatures of
history—must be in time. Their message is that the deity of the
atcmporalisLs is too remote and impersonal to be God. Yet medieval
philosophers and theologians tended to think that anything that could
count as God—as the transcendent, perfect source of all that is other
than Himself—could not be in time. The medicvals would say that
the deity of the icmporalists is too small or loo creaturelike to be
God.*
"God is eternal'1 may be understood in two ways, either as everlastingness
(through time) or as timelessncss, without extension or location in time.2*
Early defenders of timelcssness have been Augustine, Boethius and Ansclm.
Lcftow has analyzed in detail their different ways of conceiving timelessness,
arguing that divine timelessness is a consistent option. If one is able to think
consistently about divine timelessness rather than everlastingness, one may ask
whether that is an appropriate view of God. Opinions diverge on this issue.
Nelson Pike has analyzed the logical relations between the classical
understanding of divine eternity as divine timelessness and other doctrines, such
" M. Heller, "Scientific Rationality and Christian Logos," in Physics, 141.
B
 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 3.
* Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
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as immutability, omnipresence and omniscience. Timelcssncss has
consequences for the interprétation of those other attributes; consequences
which he finds objectionable. Pike sees timelessness as a Platonic influence
with hardly any scriptural basis, and points to the devastating consequences for
other doctrines, ending with the question: "What reason is there for thinking
that the doctrine of God's timelessness should have a place in a system of
Christian theology?""
The case for divine timelessness has been defended in the
contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy of religion by Paul Helm and Brian
Leftow. Timelessness is not understood as a separate attribute, but rather as
God's way of possessing certain attributes. For God's timelessness
"justification can be found in the need to draw a proper distinction between the
creator and the creature." Thus, "properties which the creator and his creatures
have in common are distinguished by their mode of possession."2* Though
the biblical narratives describe God as speaking, and performing other temporal
acts, Helm understands timelessness as offering a metaphysical underpinning
for God's functioning as the biblical God. The question is not whether
timelessness is a Greek notion or not, but "whether the thought that God is
timeless is a necessary truth-condition of all else that Christians want to say of
God."29 It has consequences at the spiritual level: "The idea of God as
timeless, as the changeless ground of all that changes, has profound
implications for the focusing of faith, hope, and love in what is unseen and
eternal rather than what is invisible and transient."30 Leftow acknowledges
that we tend to speak about God in temporal terms. However, existing
tunelessly may be treated as existing at some "date" called "eternity"—a date
which is, however, not pan of the time series, and hence does not stand in a
relation of "before," "after" or "simultaneous."
The contemporary discussion regarding the viability of the concept of
divine timelessness, framed in "possible worlds" semantics and the like, is
subtle. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to take sides with respect
to the outcome in the debate between philosophers such as Pike and John
Lucas" on the one hand and Helm and Leftow on the other. Leaving the
possible worlds of analytic philosophers of religion, we will now consider
reasons provided by the given world—as described by quantum cosmology and
quantum gravity—for taking seriously the option of timelessness. Against
Pike's "I see no reason," there are three reasons arising from the encounter with
cosmology as to why timelessness rather than everlastingness might have a
place:
27
 Pike, God and Eternity, 189f.
" Paul Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 17, 19; similarly
Leftow, Time and Eternity, 66.
" Helm, Eternal God, 22.
» Ibid., xiv.
" Lucas, The Future.
A CASE AGAINST TEMPORAL REALISM? 347
(1) Time is part of the created order. This is Augustine's view of creatio
cum tempore, but it also seems also a reasonable interprétation of most
contemporary cosmologies, with their "internal" understanding of time
(see above, 3.1). Hence, it is not meaningful to talk about God as if
there was time before the creation—God as everlasting.
Everlasungness would fit in the context of creation in time, rather than
in theories which attempt to understand the creation of time.
(2) "Time" is not universally applicable in quantum cosmologies; classical
spacelimc is recovered only as an approximate, fuzzy, notion and does
not correspond to the whole of reality as described by the
wavefunctkm, as it excludes, for example, the "imaginary time" realm
(see above, 3.2). Hence, time is unlike traditional time at the most
fundamental level of description, that of quantum gravity.
(3) The presence in physics of timeless descriptions, for example in terms
of trajectories in phase space or of spacetimes, where the whole is a
unit including all moments, suggests that it is possible to talk about
the relation of God to this whole—and not only of the relation
between God at one moment to the universe at that moment,
differentiating moments in God.
I therefore maintain that it may be useful to attempt to understand, at
least partly, God's transcendence with respect to spacetime as timelessness.
This emphasizes God's unity with respect to the world. This leaves us with at
least two possibilities.
If God is understood as a being—more or less the common sense
theistic understanding, an assumption shared by Pike and Helm—there still
might be an order, and perhaps even a flow, within God which could be
labelled God's time. As my teacher in philosophy of religion, Huib Hubbeling,
liked to ask: how could God otherwise enjoy music? If music is not enjoyable
when all notes are played at the same moment, God's perfection, also with
respect to aesthelical appreciation, requires that God has God's time. Karl
Barth seems to have defended a similar distinction between ordinary time and
God's time when he understood Jesus as the lord of time and distinguished
between an uncreated time which is one of the perfections of the divine being
and created time, with its succession of past, present, and future.32 However,
such a notion of "God's time," which would even be a universal time, is hard
to fit in once time is thoroughly physicalized. One is not free to add one
spatial dimension in contemporary superstring theories; adding another temporal
dimension is at least as problematic.
" K. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik 11112 (Zarich: Theologischer Verlag. 194«), par.
47.
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An alternative would be to deny that God should be understood as a
being, a single individual with attributes. God might, perhaps, be understood
differently, say as "being itself," "the Good," or—as might perhaps be
appropriate in the context of the natural sciences—"Intelligibility," hence more
as an abstract entity.
4.2 Divine Action
Many theologians emphasize that time is a necessary component of a
meaningful concept of divine action. There has been considerable discussion
of divine action in recent philosophy of religion." Some of these theologians
and philosophers have defended the notion of specific acts of God in time.
Others, such as Gordon Kaufman and Maurice Wiles, have opted for a more
revision!stic position, seeing the whole universe as a single master-act of God.
Leaving aside the many issues which arise from the dispute about science and
specific acts, I will briefly summarize the "single act" position as it seems
congenial to a cosmological point of view.
Kaufman regards activity proceeding from a single agent which is
ordered toward a single end "one act," regardless of the complexity of the act
or its end. Hence, "this whole complicated and intricate ideological movement
of all nature and history should be regarded as a single all-encompassing act
of God, providing the context and meaning of all that occurs."34 Taking the
whole as a single divine act might avoid problems linked with a more
interventionistic account of divine acts in nature. God's master-act is
understood to be the source of the overarching order itself. However, Kaufman
insists on temporal order.
It is meaningful to regard the fundamental structures of nature and
history as grounded in an act (of God), however, only if we are able
to see them as developing in time. An act is intrinsically temporal:
it is the ordering of a succession of events towards an end. If we
could not think of the universe as somehow developing in
" Sec W. Alston, Divine Nature and Human Action (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press. 1989), G. K. Kaufman, God the Problem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
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W. Harle, R. Preul (Marburg: Elwert, 1987; art. by R. Preul, W. Halle, H. Deuser and
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unidirectional fashion in and through temporal processes, it would
be mere poetry to speak of God's act."
Kaufman then continues with the claim that modern science, the Big Bang
theory explicitly included, makes such an understanding of the universe
possible, even though the ideological end is not well discernable to humans.
I have serious doubts about the possibility of defending a teleological
end, in a temporal sense, to the universe, though some physicists have
speculated about life in an indefinite future.36 Besides, it is not clear whether
Kaufman would be satisfied with the partial ordering of most spacetimes, the
"block" view of relativity theories, or whether he insists on a flow of time and
a universal notion of simultaneity. Such problems have already been raised
above. Here, I want to pay some attention to the notion of temporality as used
by Kaufman.
The notion of temporality seems to be used at two levels. Kaufman
ascribes temporality to God because he ascribes intentions to God. Time does
function, for him, both within the universe, the created order, and beyond it—as
a concept applicable to God (acts, intentions) as well. Is such an understanding
of time as a universal background not challenged by the idea of the creation of
time, which links time intimately with the whole created order rather than
making it a universal category applicable both to God and to the created order?
Would it not be possible to take more distance from the language of "acts,"
"causes" and the like in considering the relation between the physical universe
and the divine? If the whole of spacetime is understood as a single act of God,
could one not drop the notion of time (and causal action) at the meia-level?
Might the concept of explanation in discussing the relation between God and
the whole universe be more appropriate at that level than the concept of
causation? This brings us to the next section.
4.3 Divine Creation: God as Explanation of the Universe?
The only way of explaining the creation is to show that the creator
had absolutely no job at all to do, and so might as well not have
existed."
Is there any need for introducing a creator of the universe? I will first point
out some weaknesses in the claim that science provides a complete explanation
* Ibid., 128.
* F. I Dyson, 'Time without End: Physics and Biology in an Open Universe,"
Reviews of Modem Physics 51 (1979), 447-460; Dyson, Infinite in AU Directions (New
Yorfc Harper & Row, 1988); F. J. Tipler, The Omega-Point Theory: A Model of an
Evolving God," in Physics; Tipler, "The Omega Point as Eschaion: Answers to
Pannenberg's Questions to Scientists," Zygon. Journal of Religion A Science, 24
(1989X 217-253; see Drees, Beyond the Big Bang. 117-141.
" P. W. Atkins, The Creation (Oxford & San Francisco: Freeman, 1981), 17.
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of the universe. Next, I will consider two proposals for religious explanations
of (he universe (Swinburne, Leslie).
4.3.1 Science as Explanation of the Universe? Atkins, an eloquent defender
of the view that science leaves nothing to be explained, puts great weight on
reduction to simplicity. Beings such as elephants and humans arise through an
evolutionary process given sufficient time and atoms; atoms arise given even
more simple constituents. Perhaps the ultimate unit to be explained is, as
Atkins suggests, only spacetime; particles being specific configurations, knots
of spacetime points. The second major component in his argument is chance:
through fluctuations, nothingness separates into +1 and -1. With such dualities.
time and space come into existence. The +1 and -1 may merge again into
nothingness. However, by chance a stable configuration may come into
existence—for instance, our spacetime with three spatial dimensions and one
temporal dimension.
Atkin's idea is based on a notion considered over a decade ago,
"pregeometry," promoted by John A. Wheeler. However, the fundamental issue
has not changed significantly. For example, Hartle and Hawking wrote in their
first article on the "no-boundary" cosmology that the wave function gives "the
probability for the universe to appear from Nothing."" I would like to
suggest that such claims face at least three kinds of problems.
(i) Testability. There is a plurality of fundamental research programs
in cosmology. Experimental tests and observations may well be insufficient to
decide among the more able contenders. Aesthetic judgments are, at least
partly, decisive in opting for a specific scheme. However, what one considers
elegant, another may reject"
(ii) Exhaustiveness. Could a single and relatively simple complete
theory be fair to the complexity of the world? Or, as Mary Hesse suggests, is
it the case that for "the explanation of everything there must in a sense be a
conservation of complexity, in other words a trade-off between the simplicity
and unity of the theory, and the multiplicity of interpretations of a few general
theoretical concepts into many particular objects, properties and relations."40
We will return to this question, as it suggests a significant objection to a
platoni/ing theology related to cosmology.
(iii) A vacuum is not "nothing." The universe might be equivalent to
a vacuum as far as conserved quantities go. Those conservation laws that are
believed to be valid for the universe as a whole conserve a total quantity which
may be zero. Take, for example, electric charge. Negative charges of
electrons are matched by positive charges of protons. Atoms are electrically
* J. B. Harüe, S. W. Hawking, "Wavefunction of the Universe," Physical Review
D 28 (1983), 2960-2975; 2961.
" W. R. Stoeger, "Contemporary Cosmology and its Implications for the Science-
Religion Dialogue," in Physics, 229; J. D. Barrow, The World Within the World
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neutral. And so is, it seems, the observable universe. Even if negative and
positive charges match, there still seems to be a lot of mass. The universe is,
as far as mass is concerned, far from a vacuum: we encounter stars, planets,
and people. However, in physics mass is not a fundamental concept; it is one
of the positive forms of energy (E = me2). We need to take negative energy
into account. It takes energy to launch a rocket; hence we say that the rocket
has negative energy before being launched. In the universe the negative energy
due to gravitational binding might equal the positive energy due to the mass-
energy of the universe. Hence, the universe might well be equivalent to a
vacuum, as far as energy is concerned. Similar arguments can be made about
other properties: either they may total up to zero or they are not conserved.
The universe may have arisen "out of nothing," at least without a source of
materiality. The universe might be equivalent to a vacuum.41
The equivalence of the universe to "nothing" only holds net. It is like
someone borrowing a million Dutch guilders and buying stock for that amount.
That person would be as wealthy, fiscally speaking, as someone without any
debts and without properties. However, the first would be of more significance
on the financial market than the second. The first strategy also assumes more
than the second: the financial system is taken for granted. Hence, as far as the
conservation laws are concerned, the universe might come from a "vacuum,"
but such a vacuum is not nothing. The vacuum discussed here in the context
of creation in time is a vacuum that behaves according to the (quantum) laws
which allow for the fluctuations to happen—just as the apparent millionaire
only can get started once there is a concept of money, of borrowing. Similar
assumptions, though not about time, are in the background of the schemes
regarding the creation of time, as Isham's contribution in this volume explicitly
acknowledges. Thus, Atkins' account might still need some explanation for the
laws or similar entities which govern the vacuum.
To conclude, perhaps scientific explanations may achieve a lot, but
they do not explain without remainder. Could the remainder, such as the
existence and the laws of the vacuum, be in need of a religious explanation, or
at least support the plausibility of such a view? I will present two examples
of the latter argument. The first is based on the theistic conception of a
personal God as the preferred explanation for the universe. Another approach
does not make the transition from a causal to a personal explanation, but rather
from facts to values.
4.3.2 Richard Swinburne: A Personal Explanation? Assume that the most
fundamental law, and its effectiveness, is scientifically (causally) inexplicable.
In that case, Swinburne has argued, one has to face two possibilities: either
41
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that law is completely inexplicable or it has an explanation of another kind.
Swinburne distinguishes between causal and personal explanations. A personal
explanation should lake its starting point from a person with intentions and
certain capacities. These together determine the basic acts open to that person,
such as raising one's hand. According to Swinburne a personal explanation
cannot be reduced to a causal explanation. Even though physical concepts
(such as muscle strength) are relevant to one's capacities, and brain states are
linked to intentions, the correlations are not logically necessary.
Using this notion of "personal explanation" the most fundamental law
of the universe might have such a personal explanation: that is the way God
intended the universe to be. "The choice is between the universe as stopping-
point and God as stopping-point"*2 According to Swinburne, a universe is
much more complex than God. The supposition that there is a God is an
extremely simple supposition. A God of infinite power, knowledge, and
freedom is the simplest kind of person there could be, since the idea has no
limitations in need of explanation. The universe, on the other hand, has a
complexity, particularity, and finitude which cries out for explanation. Hence,
the religious option is to be preferred over its alternative.
There is no explicit use of science in this argument It might be
rational and valid, but that is to be debated at the level of philosophical
reasoning without support from science.41 The scientific contribution lies in
the description of the universe. However, if the choice between accepting the
universe as a brute fact or as in need of an explanation of a different kind is
justified by comparing the simplicity of the two hypotheses (as Swinburne
does), k is a matter of the utmost importance to understand how complex or
simple the two alternatives are. Many cosmologists believe that their theories
are of an impressive simplicity and elegance in structure and assumptions, even
if the mathematics is difficult Whether this makes it more or less reasonable
to regard the universe as a "creation" is not clear (why could one not believe
that God made a universe with a simple structure?) but it does tend to
undermine Swinburne's argument based on simplicity. And the more general
idea of using a person as explanation for the universe introduces the
problematic concept of a disembodied person and suggests another question:
why does that person exist. In addition, it seems to suffer from the problems
surrounding the use of a single notion of "time" on two levels, as discussed
above in relation to Kaufman.
4.3.3 John Leslie: Creative Values? Swinburne's approach does not offer an
answer to the obvious question: why does that person exist? If the person
" R. Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978),
127.
" For philosophical criticisms of Swinburne's argument, see J. L. Mackie, The
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A CASE AGAINST TEMPORAL REALISM? 353
(God) explains the universe, who or what explains that person? A person is,
according to our experience, an entity that can be or not be. However, values
seem to be different. They seem to have something absolute about them. They
might therefore be better candidates for a stopping-point in the quest for
explanation than either causal or personal explanations. However, a value lacks
effectiveness. Honesty may be a value, even though it is not realized
automatically. In general, values do not bring about the corresponding slates
of affairs. John Leslie, however, has defended the concept of creative values.
He thereby places himself in a long philosophical tradition, which places the
Good at the origin of all things. Plato seems to have held that knowledge and
existence are both dependent upon the Good, the Good surpassing all existente
in dignity and power.44 Assuming Leslie's axiarchic principle that what is of
value tends to come into existence, it may not be too difficult to argue for the
necessity of consciousness, and hence for the necessity of characteristics like
those our environment happens to have. Holding such a philosophical position,
it is not surprising that Leslie has developed a strong interest in the argument
from design in its contemporary cosmological form, based on the anthropic
coincidences. Swinburne's position seems voluntaristic, the emphasis being on
the will. Something would be good because God wills it Leslie takes another
stand: God may will something, if "will" is an adequate concept at all, because
it is good.
The idea that values could be creative is highly speculative. Our
experience is different: all too easily the good is neglected. Furthermore,
according to our experiences, values find their expression in human decisions.
Thus, in his criticism of Leslie's position J. L. Mackie has stressed that the
concept of "creative values" may well be a projection of our desire for things
judged good on these things themselves, an objectifying of human desires and
judgements.49 Do values have a platonic existence of their own, a priori of
the things in which they are expressed? Or are dis-embodied values as
problematic as dis-embodied persons? I wonder too whether such a view as
Leslie's does sufficient justice to the problem of evil: the vulnerability of the
good, the discrepancies between the real and the ideal.
Religious explanations of the universe, its existence and laws, seem to
need assumptions about dis-embodied persons or values which are at least as
problematic as the unexplained existence of the universe or its laws. Not being
able to accept the finality of a scientific or a religious explanation, I think one
does best in joining Charles Misncr:
** Plato, Republic, book VI (nr. 509). On creative values, see J. Leslie, Value and
Existence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979). On the anthropic principles in this context,
see J. Leslie, Universel (London: Routledge, 1990).
" Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 230-239, especially 239; see for another friendly
critic of Leslie's position J. J. C. Smart, Our Place in the Universe (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 176, ISO.
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To say that God created the Universe does not explain either God or
the Universe, but it keeps our consciousness alive to mysteries of
awesome majesty that we might otherwise ignore.46
4.4 Some Theological Objections to Platonizing Theology
Is a "platonic" view of reality, which seems to correlate well with
quantum cosmology and quantum gravity, a problem for Christian theology?
Is there in this respect a genuine conflict between contemporary science and a
Christian understanding of existence?
A platonizing theology is certainly different in its understanding of
God and the relations between God and the world from another view which
would put more emphasis on temporality both in God and in the world. Some
of those differences, with respect to divine eternity and divine action, have
already been explored briefly above. There seem to be possibilities, however,
for reconciling the changes in our understanding of time (and similar changes
with respect to contingency, and the like) with a concept of God which is not
totally discontinuous with the Christian tradition.
Temporal critical realists might object to the understanding of
cosmology and its consequences for theology as presented here. As an
epistemological position, it seems to be at odds with critical realism's view of
the world as consisting of substantial entities and of science as continuously
approximating the true ontology. Developments in cosmology exhibit
significant discontinuities with respect to the ontologies suggested (see above,
2.3). However important this objection may be, it concerns a philosophical
issue, or perhaps even an empirical one,17 rather than a religious issue.
There may be another objection, closer to the existential core of
Christian belief. A platonic view of reality seems to depict an abstract world
such as it might exist in the mind of God or, perhaps, of a finite knowing
subject, rather than the reality of matter and history. A platonic view tends to
emphasize the unity and coherence of the universe. Everything fits into an
encompassing mathematical structure. Primacy of unity tends to go with a top-
down approach. Reality, with its diversity, seems an illusion, since deep down
there would be no diversity nor individuality. As far as there is diversity, it
would not be good. The Good and the One are together on the divine side of
being. In contrast, "nominalism" may be the symbol for the emphasis on
diversity, and thus for a bottom-up approach. The diversity of things is the
reality we encounter. Unity is our contribution in the process of description.
Christian theology has its platonizing trends, but it is also interested in
* C. W. Misner, "Cosmology and Theology," in Cosmology, History and Theology,
eds. W. Yourgrau, A. D. Breck, (New York: Plenum Press, 1977), 95.
" That critical realism might be empirically testable is suggested by E. McMullin,
"A Case for Scientific Realism," in Scientific Realism, 29.
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particulars, especially in relation to our own being. The theologian Langdon
Gilkey is thus wary of demands for total coherence:
... the incoherent and the paradoxical, the intellectually baffling and
morally frustrating character of our experience, reflect not merely
our lack of systematic thinking but also the real nature of
creaturehood, especially "fallen creaturehood."**
Any comprehensive theological scheme is as much an attempt to think about
diversity within unity as a complete scientific theory would be. They both
remain open to a further consideration of their unity, and of the way that unity
deals with the diversity. Gilkey's statement should not be misconstrued as to
suggest that theology has no interest in the unity of an encompassing view.
But Christian theologies should remain open to the diversity of experiences,
even to the confusing and contradictory aspects of existence, such as evil. As
I see it, the danger of too much emphasis on a timeless overall view of the
universe might be that it enforces values which overemphasize unity and
neglect diversity. Both unity and diversity should be part of a satisfactory view
of the world. One might distinguish in the Christian tradition between strands
that have more affinity with "mysticism,'' with a sense of unity or harmony
with the divine, and strands that emphasize more the distance between the
actual world or the actual behavior and the way it is intended by God, a
"prophetic'' stance. A platonizing philosophy of nature might accommodate
more easily a mystical strand in die Christian tradition than the prophetic
strand, with its critical stance towards the existing order.
Is this an important conflict between a platonizing interpretation of the
universe and a Christian, existcntially shaped, attitude in life? Is this conflict,
if real, due to the limitations of such an understanding of the universe, or even
a limitation to any understanding based on the natural sciences with their
abstraction from particulars and from the present?
If the abstract, platonizing character of cosmology is deemed a
problem, one might opt for a "bottom-up" approach with respect to our
knowledge, and thus make a turn to the subject who develops such piatonic
views. However, before turning to more constructivistic approaches with
respect to religion and science, I still need to rebut one possible objection
against my argument so far: why can temporal critical realists not dismiss
quantum cosmology and quantum gravity as too speculative to be relevant?
5 Why Critical Reatists Cannot Dismiss Quantum Cosmology
One might argue that a logical conflict may always be avoided. For
instance, Philip Henry Gosse integrated evolution with belief in a recent
Gilkey, Malier of Heaven and Earth, 37.
.
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creation by holding that the world has been created with all the evidence of a
longer history—Adam with a navel and trees with rings.49 Almost any
conflict may be avoided by choosing appropriate additional hypotheses.
However, I have not entered into this line of thought, as it tends to result in ad
hoc solutions and escapes. And certainly, such ad hoc moves are not in line
with the serious work done in science and religion.
An apparently more credible way for temporal critical realists to
escape the challenges posed by quantum cosmology and quantum gravity would
be to dismiss quantum cosmology as too speculative. Ian Harbour, for
example, has suggested that "we should consider only the broadest and most
well-established features of the world disclosed by science, not its narrower or
more speculative theories."!C I will argue below that such a restriction to the
scientific consensus is ineffective. This way of dismissing quantum gravity is
not open to critical realists.
Another way to attempt to escape taking account of quantum
cosmology would be to emphasize the intermediate, "human" or organic level
of reality as the most relevant, and thus to defend passing over quantum
cosmology, for example with respect to the non-applicability of time at "early
times," such is the substance of Peacocke's remarks on the Hank-Hawking
imaginary time, referred to above (section 2.3). With respect to conventional
quantum theory, Polkinghorne once played down its significance as it "only
manifests its idiosyncratic character in processes of a smaller scale than
normally concerns us."" Believing instead that quantum R. J. Russell
humorously replied that "atoms may be small, but they're everywhere." He
went on to show that quantum physics is relevant to all sorts of, everyday
phenomena, including visual perception, the stability of matter and a host of
other phenomena" There is, of course, some relevance to Polkinghome's
position. One can still apply Newton's law of gravity for calculating orbits,
and chemistry can be done without paying much attention to the quark structure
of the atomic nuclei. I will nonetheless argue below (5.2) that in their quest
for theologies with a credible ontology it is impossible to escape reflection on
quantum gravity. This is because of the way the authors discussed here have
emphasized the unity of the sciences and of reality: both are structured in
hierarchical manners.
S.I Consensus and Speculation
Restriction to the most soundly established features is typical of
critical realism as defined by McMullin, for instance:
* P. H. Crosse, Omphalos (1857); see Edmund Gosse, Fallier and Son (London:
Heineman. 1907; Harmondsworlh: Penguin Classics, 1986), ch. 5.
30
 Harbour, "Creation and Cosmology," 143; similarly Peacocke, Intimations of
Reality, 1984, 60f.
" Polkinghorne, "The Quantum World," 334.
" Russell, "Quantum Physics," in Physics, 369.
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the longterm success of a scientific theory gives reason to believe
that something like the entities and structure postulated by the theory
actually exists."
The length of time during which the theory must be successful is unspecified,
but the general requirement is nonetheless defended as reasonable. On this
assumption, it seems reasonable to take the description of the universe as of a
fraction of a second after the apparent "t=0" as reliable, since it has been
accepted as successful for two decades—at least since the discovery of the
cosmic background radiation in the mid-sixties. Future developments, as
envisaged by the critical realists, may confirm a finite past or suggest an earlier
cosmic epoch before the apparent "t=0."
The problem with this view is that it only considers one type of future
development, an extension back in time. As argued above (2.3), the nature of
the epislemological limit—the need to integrate quantum theories and spacetime
theories around or before the Planck time—is such that it may well affect the
entire interpretation of Big Bang theory. On the view of quantum gravity
which we have followed so far, the quantum view of time turns out to be very
different. Therefore, one also needs to reinterpret the concept of spacetime
view in Big Bang theory, and thus the part upon which there is consensus.
Similarly, one could argue that the co-existence of a plurality of serious
research programs which all accept the Big Bang theory in its "consensus"
domain, shows that the Big Bang theory may well be open to a variety of
future developments or interpretations, suggesting different ontologies.54
The variety of possible developments and interpretations of cosmology
seems to offer temporal critical realists the possibility that there might be a
cosmology which would fit their view of time, for example by assuming a
M inkowski background spacetime. If a Minkowski background spacetime
would not do, they could perhaps even opt for a cosmology with a universal
notion of simultaneity so as to allow for a uni vocal définition of concepts such
as "God's past" and "God's future." Among the serious contenders in
cosmology the programs of Penrose and Vilenkin might be slightly more
attractive to temporalisls than Hawking's." However, Penrose too has
expressed the conviction that time and space may be notions of limited
significance, and Vilenkin's approach was the one actually used by Isham in
his contribution to set forth die features of quantum cosmology and quantum
gravity, with "internal" lime and "imaginary time."
If one allows theological or metaphysical preferences to be decisive
in the choice of theories or in the interpretation of theories, some relief might
53
 McMullin, "A Case for Scientific Realism.' 26.
51
 See the comparison of the approaches by Linde, Hawking and Penrose in W. B.
Drees, "Quantum Cosmologies and the 'Beginning'" Zygon: Journal of Religion &
Science 26 (1991X 373-396, and in Drees. Beyond the Big Bang, 62-69.
" Pelen, "On Creating the Cosmos," 295; Drees, Beyond the Big Bang. 68.
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be available for lemporalists. However, a critical realist has to accept the fact
that by the standards of critical realism certain possibilities are no longer open.
One would have to accept two major transitions of "longterm success": the
transition from Newtonian time to the concepniality of special relativity, which
led to the dismissal of absolute simultaneity, and the transition from the special
to the general theory of relativity, which led to the transition from external to
internal time. Hence, though some eclecticism might be permissible, but one
cannot—by the standard of longterm success—back away from quantum
cosmology and gravity where it is in the process of developing such concepts.
In general, there seem to be four possibilities with respect to the way
one deals with the consensus, and the lack of consensus, in science.
(i) Eclecticism: one takes whatever fits best. This attitude is present
in much religious use of more speculative scientific statements, such as those
of David Bohm or John Wheeler. Taking one's selection from science in such
a manner might be a contribution to the development of an intelligible and
coherent view. However, it makes no contribution to the credibility of the
position under consideration. It may even be to its disadvantage if the selection
is made in a rather arbitrary manner.
(ii) Cheap dismissal: theologians need not pay attention to science,
since the scientists are not themselves certain of their claims. Thus, theologians
might claim to be free to hold whatever position they like. As long as the
scientists, in this case the cosmologists, do not reach a consensus, anything
goes. Such an approach would neglect the partial consensus among scientists.
Though there is some variety of positions, many alternatives have been ruled
out Hence, to dismiss some science because of a lack of consensus is not
really warranted.
(iii) Cautiously wait and see what will become the consensus.
"Viable theologies need not, at the moment, even be consistent with such ideas,
since these ideas are speculative at this time."96 There is, I admit, no strict
need for consistency with all speculative scientific theories. However, the
scientific consensus is not that clear and safe either, as it is open to future
developments which may cause significant reinlerpretation. As R. J. Russell
observed: "In active areas of scientific research, there are always numerous
competing theories as well as competing interpretations of theories. If our
strategy is to wait for agreement, I fear we will be limited to historical
studies."57 Moreover, he stresses that agreement is seldom unambiguous:
what guarantees that it really has been reached? what about the eventual
replacement of even "accepted" theories?
(iv) Reverse eclecticism: take the worst possible case. If one were
able to show how it might be incorporated in a certain religious-metaphysical
* H. L, Shipman, 'The Création of Order from Chaos," in Creation and tne End
of Days, eds. D. Novak and N. Samuclson (Lanham: University Press of America,
1986), 9.
" Russell. "Quantum Physics," in Physics, 370.
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scheme, one would really have made progress. Taking science "where it huns
most" offers the greatest challenge, but also the greatest profit with respect to
credibility.51
5.2 The Unavoidability of Quantum Gravity
Arthur Peacocke and other temporal critical realists have pleaded for
a hierarchical view of reality, whereby higher levels of reality are constrained
by lower levels but not determined by them, nor cpisiemologically fully
reducible to them. A biological description of reality is not reducible to one
in physical terms, though it cannot contradict the physical laws involved, such
as the conservation of energy. Through this hierarchical structuring of the
sciences, they are able to combine interest in the unity of the sciences ("One
World") with an anti-reductionistk stance which, among other aims, intends to
do justice to (he distinct contributions offered by different disciplines. Roughly
speaking, the hierarchy extends from the physical sciences through the life
sciences up to psychology and cultural sciences, with theology occupying the
uppermost level.
One may question the linear structuring of the sciences. It may be that
some disciplines do not so much fit at one level as serve to integrate different
levels. For example, one might defend the view that genetics in biology serves
to integrate evolutionary biology, ecology and ethology as higher levels with
physiology, histology, and molecular biology at lower levels.59 Similarly, one
might claim that theology serves an integrating role rather than that it occupies
the uppermost level. It might perhaps be more suitable to consider a network
structure than a hierarchy. However, a network would do less justice to the
intuition that some sciences are more basic than others, though specific sciences
could still be considered as constraints upon other sciences.
Let us assume the hierarchical structuring. A change in the concept
of energy in physics would then imply changes in the way the metabolism of
living organisms is understood. The discovery of the conservation of energy
in the nineteenth century, as well as the proper definition of concepts such as
free energy, has had its impact on higher level sciences, for instance those
studying the metabolisms of organisms. If "energy" were discovered to be
wrongly defined, biology would have to adapt. The constraints imply (hat
1
 L. Eaves, "Spirit, Method, and Content in Science and Religion: The
Theological Perspective of a Geneticist," Zygon: Journal of Religion A Science 24
(1989), 185-215, 203. Eaves deals with the role of genetics, also in a response to the
papal message of the 1987 conference: "biologists need to be assured that their science
is to be accorded the same sensitivity and respect that His Holiness' message has
extended to physics" (L. Eaves, "Autonomy Is Not Enough," in John Paul II on Science
and Religion: Reflections on the New View from Rome. 22). Similarly, I intend to warn
against eclecticism with respect to the treatment of time in quantum cosmology.
" E. T. Juengst, "Response: Carving Nature at Ils Joints," Religion and Intellectual
Life 5 (Spring 1986). 70-78.
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changes in our understanding at lower levels of the hierarchy of the sciences
have consequences for higher levels insofar as the higher levels use the same
concepts and laws.
Now in the case of quantum gravity it is not the concept of energy
which is at stake, but rather the concept of time. The changes initiated by the
general theory of relativity have affected our understanding of the Newtonian
theory. Not that it led to much change at the level of calculations done in a
Newtonian framework, but it affected the assessment of the metaphysical
adequacy of its view of space and time as absolutes. Similarly, quantum
theories affected the assessment of the metaphysical adequacy of the billiard-
ball view of material substance. The same should hold for a theory which
affects our concepts of space and lime: it should rank extremely low in the
hierarchy of the sciences, due to the very general and basic concepts involved,
and thus affect our view of all the other sciences. If, for example, time and
space were shown to have a discrete rather than a continuous character, this
would, in principle, affect our understanding of all the laws of
physics—formulated as they are in terms of differential equations. If time were
shown to be a derivative and not a fundamental concept, it would not be
acceptable to treat time as a Newtonian, external absolute at higher levels—at
least not for metaphysical purposes. Thus, one cannot dismiss quantum gravity
in such a perspective as dealing with distances and durations which are too
small to be relevant The issue is not just quantum cosmology, but quantum
gravity—the theory which would be the physical theory below the levels
occupied by quantum theories and general relativity theory.
It would seem an unacceptable, ad hoc move for critical realists to
dismiss quantum cosmology and quantum gravity just because its resultant view
of time displeases them. And its understanding of the nature of time carries
over to all levels of the sciences, including the life-sciences, the humanities and
theology, due to the realist view which unites the sciences into a hierarchy,
since quantum gravity would have to be located at the bottom, fundamental
level.
An alternative might be to put less emphasis on the unity of the
sciences. It might be that different sciences lead to different views of reality,
but without allowing for the coherence and unity suggested by the hierarchical
view. Rather, in the various sciences different views of reality are constructed,
without claiming that they need to be ordered in such a hierarchical fashion.
Thus, it might be possible that the concept of time used at different levels can
vary. Such an attitude towards the sciences would, of course, be more modest
in that it withdraws the metaphysical intention of achieving, or at least
approximating, an encompassing view of all aspects of reality.
6 Cosmology and Theology as Myths
It is far beyond the scope of the present paper to attempt to do justice
to the various ways in which less "realistic" approaches to theology have been
developed. One might think of nominalistic strands in the history of theology,
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the various turns to existentialism, ethics, narrative, social snuggle, and the
rules of discourse in language games. Many of those less realistic approaches
lack interest in the dialogue with the natural sciences. However, this is not
necessarily the case. In order to show the existence, and to suggest the
viability, of a third approach in science and religion, in addition to temporal
and platonic realism, some aspects of the woric of Mary Hesse on science and
theology will be discussed.60 The last section (6.2) will suggest some lines
along which I think that one might develop such ideas into a substantial
theological position.
6.1 Mary Hesse: The Construction of Reality
The problem is essentially not one of scientific "realism," but of
communicative strategy.*'
Mary Hesse has defended a network model of science. Such a model tends to
stress instrumental goals, valuing prediction and control, "at the expense of
realism, if realism is interpreted in terms of universalizable theoretical
explanation.1*2
She has called her position on various occasions "realism," but
qualifies that significantly. For example, what counts as the primary
individuals is theory-relative; they may well be superseded in another theory.
There is, taking her view, no reason to deny the existence of something
formerly referred lo as "phlogiston." However, its "what" is not decided
thereby. "What those substances or those atoms actually are. is something
whose description changes from theory to theory, and will never be finally
settled as long as science continues to develop. Theories about essences are
neither stable nor cumulative, and are therefore not part of the realistic aspects
of science." Thus, theoretical descriptions asserting that space is Euclidean or
that it has non-zero curvature are unstable and non-cumulative. This does not
exclude accumulations of approximate forms of law. "If such accumulation of
approximations is thought insufficient for 'realism', then this account of science
may be called instrumentalist, but there are other respects in which it is nearer
*° Another example would be die hermeneuucal approach advocated in science- and-
religion by a group of die University of Neuchalel (Switzerland). An extensive
presentation of the theoretical ideas and various applications, for instance on Artificial
Intelligence, came to my knowledge only after concluding this contribution. P. Bühler,
P.-L. Dubied, C. Karakash, O. Schäfer-Guigner, G. Thcissen, Science et foi font
système: Une approche herméneutique (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1992).
" Hesse, "Retrospect," in The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century,
287.
" M. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974), 284.
One could also consult her Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of
Science (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), especially 63-110. She acknowledges her debt lo
W. V. O. Quine for die term "network model.'
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to realism." It certainly is not the case that anything goes. Science is a learning
process, with systematic self-correction. "Natural scientific inference has
rational grounds, but these are essentially finite and local in application, and
determined by empirical conditions of testability and self-correction."43
In the Gifford lectures delivered by Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse,
learning is discussed in a wider context Taking up a suggestion from Piaget,
the concept of a schema becomes central. Schemas may represent objects or
actions, with perceptual schémas serving to supply the parameters that afford
the action. In the line of Piaget's work on the development of schémas, one
might think of them in a dynamic Kantian way; "the categories are no longer
a priori, but change over time."" Schemas do not arise as ideas in isolation.
They are not closed semantic nets, as dictionaries are—words explaining words.
Interaction with the world, in perception and action, is central, and thus is
embodiment. It is essential to link the development of knowledge structures
in artificial intelligence with "being in the world."
In the context of the network model, Hesse has emphasized the limited
scope of theories and the role of the pragmatic, instrumentalistic criterion. This
has:
negative implications for the universal ontologicai and cosmological
consequences that have sometimes been held to derive from natural
science. There has been a constant tendency for the prestige of
instrumental success to flow back into temporary ontologies and
analogies, and to infect social and metaphysical thought about the
nature and destiny of man and the universe."
Thus, "no truths about the substance of nature which are relevant to
metaphysics or theology can be logically derived from physics." "No
substantial consequences about the world can be drawn from this game
[science] except what were put into it.'"*
The use of science in theology might be apologetic, a matter of
communication and status. "It would be a mistake now, as it was then, to build
the details of such models of causality too firmly into our doctrine of God.
They may provide useful analogies for apologetics and a useful liberation from
too constrained a notion of God, but they are not essential to central theological
beliefs, nor can they logically disprove such beliefs.'47 In the context of the
present article, it may be of interest that she applies this also to considerations
" Hesse, Structure of Scientific Inference, 299, 300, 302.
" M. A. Arbib, M. B. Hesse, The Construction cf Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1986), 43.
** Hesse, Structure of Scientific Inference, 301.
** Hesse, "Physics, Philosophy and Myth," in Physics, 189, 198; compare earlier
remarks regarding the technical role of the background in quantum cosmology (e.g.,
notes 17 and 19).
" Hesse, "Physics, Philosophy and Myth," 191.
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regarding the static or dynamic nature of reality, even paying some attention
to quantum cosmology."
"In any case, it is unprofitable in an antimetaphysical age to seek to
make the world safe for religion by metaphysics. Such a procedure
is anachronistic and intellectually barren for believers and
unbelievers alike. But there is no need for it In relation to the
Christian religion, at least, there are no intellectual foundations for
belief except in the continuing tradition of practice, theology, and
changing historical experience, which are all rooted in the Great
Schema itself."69
Rather than looking for scientific contributions to a metaphysical
theology of nature in the traditional sense, it may be more fruitful to regard
science as consisting in "debates about an appropriate language for theology,
and a source of appropriate models."10 Hence, the issue is how theological
concepts "may be expressed in a language accessible to those nurtured in the
scientific framework." Science and theology "meet on the ground of different
but comparable social symbolisms rather than of common subject matter or of
method."71
6.2 The Christophoric Circle
Hesse focuses on epistemology, interpretations of physics and
theology, rather than on interpretations of nature. However, some omologicaJ
consequences seem to follow. One is the emphasis, especially in the Gifford
lectures, on "embodied existence," on the essential role of perception and action
in relation to thinking. Another, related one, is the emphasis on the interaction
if not interwovenness of truth and value, for example in her understanding of
language. If embodiment, perception and action, are taken to be central, the
imago Dei notion cannot be focused exclusively on human reason or rationality,
but should relate to action, as expressed in the phrase imitatio Christi. This
may well be illustrated with the legend of Christopher.
Christopher—not yet bearing that name—was an impressive figure,
strong as a bear. He wanted to serve no one but the highest king. He thus
went to serve the greatest human king—until he discovered that the king was
afraid of the devil. He then served the devil, but discovered that the devil
avoided crossings. Thus, Christopher discovered that Christ must be greater
than the devil. He then longed to serve Christ, but could not find him. Advised
by a hermit, Christopher took on a humble task that fitted his
" Ibid.. 200 n.13.
" Arbib & Hesse, The Construction of Reality, 243.
70
 M. Hase, "Retrospect," in The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century,
287.
71
 Ibid, 287. 282.
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capacities—helping people to cross a river. After many years a child called
.upon him to help him across. But the child turned out to be unexpectedly
heavy. It was Christ, who carries the world—depicted in many images as a
globe.
There is a circularity in the story which is not fully captured in the
common depictions of it Christopher carries the child while the child carries
the world—on which Christopher should be understood to be standing. It
seems to me an apt representation of a religious attitude which acknowledges
the human, constructive side of faith: images of God are our schemes, they
exist in us, individually and socially. But those human images are images that
intend to express something that transcends us, both quantitatively (a persistent
mystery beyond) and qualitatively (a greater and different love, a higher
perfection than we will ever realize and an otherness which confronts us). The
child that we carry may be the child that carries the world, including ourselves.
As acting and thinking come together, the relation between values and
facts—axiology and cosmology one might say—comes in sight. Some
contemporary contributions to "science and religion'' seek to relate religious
thought to the contemporary world view suggested by the sciences. If dial
approach is taken in isolation, cosmology may, for example, by analogy and
extrapolation, be related to order and design, to a positive view of God as the
Maker of Heaven and Earth. The extrapolation might also, due to awareness
of epistemological limitations on cosmology, be seen to suggest a mystery
beyond knowledge.72 Such ways of understanding God may be deemed pale
and irrelevant to our individual and social existence.73 An attractive feature
of a more self-consciously limited view of scientific knowledge is that it leaves
room for a more independently formulated understanding of God. But the
advantage may also turn into a disadvantage: loo much freedom, as mutual
irrelevance, may lead to a loss of credibility.
One way to keep a proper distance from cosmology, of allowing for
the correct amount of independence of cosmology from theology, is the turn to
axiology, to the ethical and existential decisions that humans have to face, as
the primary locus of theology. This may lead to questions about the nature of
values in a world of facts. One might consider granting values a platonic kind
of existence, or point out how they function in the social world, arguing that
science is unable to measure them as values. Elsewhere I have tried to define
theology formally as the attempt to think the unity of cosmology and axiology,
of "facts" and "values," whether as being in harmony or not74 I prefer to
hold that values should interrupt and confront our behavior (facts) with
something else, with what might be considered as God's intentions, if we are
71
 For instance in M. K. Muniu, Cosmic Understanding (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986).
71
 Hesse, "Physics, Philosophy and Myth," 199.
" W. B. Drees, 'Theologie en natuurwetenschap: onafhankelijkheid en
samenhing," in Hans KUng et al.. Godsdienst op een keerpunt (Kampen, NL: Kok,
1990).
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to do justice to the prophetic strands in the Christian tradition. This may be
neglected when too much emphasis is placed on the coherence of the various
sciences and theology, on consonance between our understanding of physical
reality and of God, as seems to be the intent of many more realistic theologies,
and even more so of so-called "new age" religious philosophies. A lack of
interest in the manifold tensions typical of human existence, as seems to
characterize most plaionizing theologies, may as well endanger the possibility
of a confrontive, interruptive style of ethical thinking. On the other hand,
religious thinking which restricts itself to ethical issues may fall short in
providing a basis for motivation and empowerment, even in the face of failures.
As in the image of Christopher and the child, we have to act, to carry the child,
but we do so on the assumption that we are carried by something—power,
mystery, love?—far beyond us.
